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INTRODUCTION 
Introducing the new edition of Karl Llewellyn’s The Theory of 
Rules, Fred Schauer writes that “[i]n Great Britain and much of the rest 
of the common law world, Legal Realism is taught mostly as a joke, or 
at least as a convenient foil for demonstrating the wisdom of H.L.A. 
Hart.”1  Schauer of course has American Legal Realism in mind when 
he thus objects to the failure to take Legal Realism seriously.  It is 
often overlooked however that this particular brand of Legal Realism 
was not the only victim of Hart’s critique to which Schauer is 
implicitly alluding.
2
  In fact, the immediate target of some of the most 
celebrated remarks of Hart as the great English Legal Positivist of the 
20th century was Scandinavian Legal Realism, a school of legal theory 
contemporary with and in many ways related to American Legal 
Realism but today unknown to most legal scholars in the United States.  
In particular, Hart’s aim was the Dane Alf Ross whom he later 
described as “the most acute and best-equipped philosopher of this 
school”.3  Reviewing in 1959 the English translation of Alf Ross’s On 
Law and Justice (1958, 1st Danish ed. 1953), Hart articulated the key 
elements of his famous critique that only later in The Concept of Law 
was broadened to include Legal Realism as such.
4
 
This critique had a lasting negative effect on the Anglo-American 
reception of Ross’s work reducing him too to the role as an extra in the 
great H.L.A. Hart show.
5
  Thus, e.g. the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy states, in reference to these works, that ‘Hart famously 
demolished’ Ross’s analysis of normative statements and thereby 
strongly influenced the contemporary perception that Scandinavian 
Realism is “more a museum piece than a live contender in 
jurisprudential debate”.6 
 
 1.  Frederick Schauer, Introduction to KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE THEORY OF RULES 
1, 4 (Karl N. Llewellyn & Frederick Schauer eds., 2011).  
 2. See infra Parts I & III for a detailed presentation of Hart’s critique of Legal 
Realism. 
 3. See H. L. A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence 13 (1983). 
 4. See H. L. A. Hart, Scandinavian Realism, 17 THE CAMBRIDGE L.J. 233–40 (1959); 
See also H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 136–47 (2nd ed. 1994). 
 5. Another highly influential factor is Ross’s heavy reliance on the tenets of logical 
positivism which not many modern philosophers consider viable today.  For an attempt to 
overcome this challenge, see: Jakob v. H. Holtermann, Naturalizing Alf Ross’s Legal 
Realism: A Philosophical Reconstruction, REVUS. J. FOR CONST. THEORY AND PHIL. OF L. 
165–86 (2014); Jakob v. H. Holtermann, Getting Real or Staying Positive: Legal Realism(s), 
Legal Positivism and the Prospects of Naturalism in Jurisprudence, RATIO JURIS: AN INT'L 
J. OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHIL. OF L. 535-55 (2015). 
 6. Brian Leiter, Naturalism in Legal Philosophy, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed. 2014). It bears noting that Leiter emphasizes that he is 
referring only to the long-term effects of Hart’s critique on the reception of Ross’s theory, 
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Crucial to this alleged demolition was Hart’s – in legal theory 
well-known and much celebrated – introduction of a  
distinction between internal and external aspects of social rules.
7
  
Indeed, Hart originally introduced this distinction in his work at least 
partly in order to demonstrate what he perceived to be fundamental 
inadequacies of legal realism in general and of Ross’s legal theory in 
particular.
8
 
In this Article, I argue that received opinion is mistaken.  Or 
rather, since I do not discuss Scandinavian Realism as such but limit 
my discussion to Ross’s legal philosophy as formulated in his main 
work On Law and Justice,
9
 I make the more modest claim that received 
opinion is mistaken with regard to this particular theory.  I am not the 
first to make this claim.  Indeed, Ross himself made it already in his 
return review of The Concept of Law, where—being true to character—
he had considerable problems hiding his hurt feelings over Hart’s harsh 
judgement and expressed his “belief that in fundamentals the Oxford 
philosophy and the Scandinavian Approach have more in common than 
Hart has been able to see.”10 
Maintaining a more coolheaded approach a small number of other 
authors have since followed suit.
11
  Although the efforts of these 
authors are commendable, my claim in this paper is that, as a result of 
the way they have constructed the argument, they have predominantly 
 
and that Leiter makes certain reservations about the correctness of Hart’s rendering of 
Ross’s analysis and thereby also of the soundness of Hart’s critique. For similar assessments 
without reservations for soundness,  see, e.g., Thomas Mautner, Some Myth about Realism, 
23 RATIO JURIS 422–25 (2010); Scott J. Shapiro, What Is the Internal Point of View?, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1157 (2006).  For similar assessments of long-term effect which 
challenge Hart’s argument more directly,  see, e.g., Enrico Pattaro, From Hägerström to 
Ross and Hart, 22 RATIO JURIS 532 (2009); Svein Eng, Lost in the System or Lost in 
Translation? The Exchanges between Hart and Ross, 24 RATIO JURIS 194 (2011). 
 7. This internal/external distinction shall be elaborated on further below.  See infra 
Part I.  For now, the external aspect of legal rules can preliminarily be defined as the 
outwardly observable regularities of behaviour that the observance of rules has in common 
with a group that follows a social habit.  The internal aspect, by contrast, refers to that 
element which singles out rule-governed social practices from mere group habits, and 
which, according to Hart, is characterized by the existence in members of the group of an 
outwardly unobservable so-called critical reflective attitude towards deviation from the 
standards of behaviour expressed by the rule. 
 8. See Hart, Scandinavian Realism, supra note 4, at 237–38; See also H. L. A. HART, 
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 13–14 (1983). 
 9. ALF ROSS, ON LAW AND JUSTICE  (1958) (Original in Danish, Om ret og 
retfærdighed : En indførelse i den analytiske retsfilosofi  (Nyt Nordisk Forlag. Arnold Busck 
A/S 1. ed. 1953)). 
 10. Alf Ross, Review of H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 71 Yale L.J. 1190 (1962); 
See also Alf Ross, Validity and the Conflict Between Legal Positivism and Natural Law, 
REVISTA JURIDICA DE BUENOS AIRES 84-88 (1961). 
 11. See MICHAEL MARTIN, LEGAL REALISM: AMERICAN AND SCANDINAVIAN (1997); 
See also Pattaro, supra note 6; See also Eng, supra note 6.  
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drawn the wrong conclusions.  In particular, I disagree with the view 
initially championed by Ross himself that once we have the 
misunderstandings behind Hart’s criticism sorted out we learn that they 
were actually in agreement.  The latest argument to this effect was 
launched by the Norwegian legal philosopher and widely recognized 
Ross-scholar Svein Eng, whose otherwise very commendable study 
concludes that Hart’s method was in fact also Ross’s method and that 
any perception of a theoretical gulf between them is therefore wrong.
12
 
I believe however that this conclusion is mistaken, first because it 
simultaneously underestimates and overestimates the theoretical 
sophistication of Ross’s and Hart’s theories respectively, and second 
because it blurs what I take to be the really important theoretical 
distinction between the two. 
It is after all fairly easy to establish that Ross in fact predates Hart 
in introducing a distinction between internal and external aspects of 
social rules.
13
  What is more interesting is that we find this distinction 
analysed and expressed with much greater clarity and consistency in 
Ross’s writings.  Thus, behind Hart’s writings on internal and external 
aspects of social rules there lies not one but two important distinctions 
that are logically distinct, and Hart consistently confuses these two 
distinctions and their interrelations.  Ross, on the other hand, is not 
only very well aware of their existence; his entire theory revolves 
around an acute appreciation of their jurisprudential significance.  He 
expressly addresses issues connected with both of them, and, in 
contrast to Hart, he consistently observes both of them throughout his 
writings. 
Setting the record straight on these issues holds the promise 
therefore not only of shedding light on the debates about internal and 
external aspects of social rules and law generally that have dominated 
large parts of legal philosophy for more than fifty years. 
More importantly, by pinpointing exactly how Hart’s and Ross’s 
methods are not the same, this debate gives us a privileged opportunity 
to redraw the broader theoretical landscape of jurisprudence and in 
particular of identifying exactly where we could draw the line between 
legal positivism and legal realism in a clear and principled way. 
In order to convincingly argue this point we need to go back and 
closely re-examine the debate between Ross and Hart.  I shall therefore 
proceed as follows.  First, I summarize Hart’s motivation for 
 
 12. See Eng, supra note 6, at  241–42.  
 13. For these purposes my focus is ON LAW AND JUSTICE to the exclusion of Ross’s 
earlier works because his legal philosophy underwent a significant development on these 
crucial issues, and it is only in this latter work that we find the relevant distinctions worked 
out with sufficient clarity. 
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introducing the distinction between internal and external aspects of 
rules, and in so doing I make a first approximation of Hart’s criticism 
of Ross’s theory.  Second, I show why the argument thus constructed 
misfires in so far that it overlooks both Ross’s distinction between 
behaviourist and introspective methods and his explicit acceptance of 
the latter in legal science.  Third, I consider a second and somewhat 
more convincing version of Hart’s criticism which admits that Ross did 
not simply overlook the internal aspect of social rules, but claims 
instead that he misinterpreted it.  Fourth, I show how this objection 
rests on a failure to appreciate the subtlety and richness of Ross’s 
position by overlooking a second, logically distinct distinction which is 
crucially at play in Ross’s theory, i.e. the distinction between norm-
descriptive and norm-expressive propositions.  Fifth, I summarise the 
main results of the discussion and try to locate what I believe to be the 
real disagreement between Ross and Hart. 
I.  HART’S OBJECTION # 1: HABITS AND SOCIAL RULES AND THE 
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF SOCIAL RULES 
Hart’s introduction of the distinction between internal and external 
aspects is motivated by his discussion of what rules are, and of what it 
means to say that rules exist.
14
  As a first candidate-answer, Hart 
famously considers the so-called predictive account which he finds 
unsatisfactory because it confounds two distinct social phenomena: 
rule-governed behaviour and mere habit-based convergent behaviour.
15
  
What is missing in the predictive account and what ultimately singles 
out rule-governed social practises from mere group habits, Hart finds, 
is the existence of a particular critical reflective attitude among 
members of the group: 
What is necessary is that there should be a critical reflective 
attitude to certain patterns of behaviour as a common standard, and 
that this should display itself in criticism (including self-criticism), 
demands for conformity, and in acknowledgments that such 
criticism and demands are justified, all of which find their 
characteristic expression in the normative terminology of ‘ought’, 
 
 14. This part of Hart’s theory is well-rehearsed in the literature.  However, part of the 
reason why the discussion has gone astray is insufficient attention to certain details.  I shall 
therefore go to some length elaborating first Hart’s and later Ross’s line of reasoning on the 
relevant issues. 
 15. See Hart supra note 4, in particular chapters I, IV and V – although in chapter IV 
Hart’s immediate object of discussion is so-called habit-based accounts of obedience but his 
argument is continuous and consistent with the arguments applied in his critique of the 
predictive account. For ease of expression I shall only refer to the predictive account. 
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‘must’, and ‘should’, ‘right’ and ‘wrong’.
16
 
I shall get back to the details of this account later.  What is 
important at this point is that this attitude according to Hart constitutes 
the internal aspect of rules, which differs from their external aspect 
consisting merely in the outwardly observable regularities of behaviour 
that rules have in common with social habits.
17
 
It is not entirely clear whether Hart himself believed that these 
deficiencies in the so-called predictive account could also be ascribed 
to Ross’s legal theory as it is presented in On Law and Justice.  On the 
one hand, it appears that the immediate object of Hart’s criticism is 
Austin’s “command-model” with its emphasis on the notion of habit.18  
But Hart elaborates at some length in his review of Ross the 
shortcomings of identifying statements about rules with predictions of 
behaviour, which in context makes it natural to assume that this view is 
attributed also to Ross.  Also, Hart later wrote that his main objection 
to Ross’s legal philosophy was precisely the same as against the 
predictive account: that Ross failed “to mark and explain the crucial 
distinction that there is between mere regularities of human behaviour 
and rule-governed behaviour.”19 
Thus there is at least some textual evidence supporting the reading 
of Hart’s criticism presented thus far as being directed not only against 
Austin’s command theory and “the predictive account” but also against 
Ross. 
II.   ROSS ON THE INTERNAL1-EXTERNAL1 DISTINCTION 
Qua criticism of Ross, however, the argument thus constructed 
misfires rather badly.  If what we are after is a distinction which makes 
us capable of telling these two social phenomena apart, then such a 
 
 16. HART, supra note 4, at 57. 
 17. In close connection with this distinction between internal and external aspects of 
rules Hart introduces two additional, philosophically important internal/external distinctions, 
viz. the twin distinctions between internal and external points of view and between internal 
and external (legal) statements respectively.  See Id. at 291.  These two distinctions map on 
to the first distinction in such a way that they would appear to be merely additional aspects 
of the same fundamental distinction: the distinction between internal and external points of 
view appears to describe the two different perspectives from which one can identify the 
internal and the external aspects of rules respectively.  Correspondingly, statements made 
from either of these two points of view on the adhering aspect of social rules could be called 
internal and external (legal) statements respectively. 
 18. John Austin (1790-1859) is by many considered the founder of analytical 
jurisprudence and legal positivism.  See J. AUSTIN, AUSTIN: THE PROVINCE OF 
JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED, (Wilfred E. Rumble ed., Revised ed. 1995).  
 19. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 8, at 13.  This is 
also how Hart’s argument has been read—at least occasionally.  See, e.g., Leiter, supra note 
6, at 191; See also Shapiro, supra note 6, at 1163. 
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distinction is clearly present in Ross’s writings.  In order to illustrate 
this point, we need to rehearse the core of Ross’s legal philosophy as 
presented in On Law and Justice.  Again, this may seem familiar to 
some readers but the exposition provides premises in an argument the 
conclusion of which has not been considered commonplace. 
We can of course appreciate why the idea that Ross was unable to 
distinguish between these two social phenomena can have occurred in 
the first place.  After first taking Hans Kelsen’s pure theory of law and 
later Axel Hägerström’s anti-metaphysical Uppsala-school as his main 
philosophical inspirations, the Alf Ross we encounter in On Law and 
Justice (1958, Danish original 1953) is inspired mainly by the 
philosophical tenets of logical positivism.
20
  Crucial to this 
philosophical school is the possibility of establishing inter-subjective 
verifiability of any proposition claiming to be scientific—a criterion to 
be met either directly or derivatively from propositions that are thus 
verifiable. 
Taking this starting point it does indeed seem that, among 
scientific disciplines, the study of law presents a particular challenge.  
Ross considers law to be a body of rules, i.e. of norms prescribing 
behaviour.
21
  Linguistically Ross categorizes such norms as 
directives.
22
  Directives are usually (but not always) identifiable by 
normative words like “shall be,” “may,” “must,” etc.23  Furthermore, 
Ross observes that sentences traditionally found in scholarly legal 
doctrinal work appear linguistically to be no different from the 
directives of legal rules: they apparently prescribe behaviour frequently 
using the same kind of deontic markers.
24
 
The epistemological challenge arises because it is not clear how 
such normative propositions can honour the strict criteria for being 
scientific adopted by logical positivism.  In particular, we see why 
Ross must ban the epistemological strategy of natural law, which, in 
his interpretation, is rationalist: it attempts to derive the validity of 
normative legal statements from a foundation of self-evident truths of 
reason.  More specifically, natural law tries to derive legal validity 
from one foundational, intuitively valid idea of justice which is 
constitutive of law, and to which all human beings, qua rational 
 
 20. See Ross supra note 9. 
 21. ROSS, supra note 9, at 6-11. 
 22. See Ross, supra note 9 at 7. 
 23. As a random example of a directive, Ross mentions “the rule in the Uniform 
Negotiable Instruments Act, s. 62, which prescribes that the acceptor of a negotiable 
instrument engages that he will pay it according to the tenor of his acceptance.”  Id. at 32–
33.  
 24. Id. at 9.  
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creatures, have access and will assent.
25
 
To the logical positivist, however, the problem with such 
intuitions is that they, in contrast to sense perceptions, are inextricably 
private.  Intuitions can vary from person to person— and patently do so 
quite often.  As Ross puts it in one of his most quoted passages: 
Like a harlot, natural law is at the disposal of everyone.  The 
ideology does not exist that cannot be defended by an appeal to the 
law of nature.  And, indeed, how can it be otherwise, since the 
ultimate basis for every natural right lies in a private direct insight, 
an evident contemplation, an intuition.  Cannot my intuition be just 
as good as yours?  Evidence as a criterion of truth explains the 
utterly arbitrary character of the metaphysical assertions.  It raises 
them up above any force of inter-subjective control and opens the 
door wide to unrestricted invention and dogmatics.
26
 
It is often overlooked, however, that while striking a less hostile 
pose Ross is in fact equally dismissive of the legal positivists’ attempts 
to justify statements of legal doctrine formally on the basis of a 
foundational norm regardless of its moral value (a Grundnorm or a rule 
of recognition).
27
  Thus shunning the two traditional foundationalist 
strategies for the doctrinal study of law, Ross seems forced to take a 
wholly different tack.  In particular, it seems that he, as a logical 
positivist, has no other option but to adopt a strictly behaviourist 
approach to law.
28
  Banning private intuitions of justice we seem to be 
left with publicly observable regularities of human behaviour.  But this 
way it seems we would be definitively barred, on pain of committing 
the naturalistic fallacy, from recognizing the normative element so 
characteristic of law.
29
  And insofar that this is the case, it could seem 
 
 25. See Id. at 65–66.  As an example of such an idea of justice Ross mentions Kant’s 
formulation of the highest principle of law: “A course of action is lawful if the liberty to 
pursue it is compatible with the liberty of every other person under a general rule.”  Id. at 
276.  Thus if the acceptor of a negotiable instrument has a duty to pay, it is ultimately 
because it would be incompatible with the liberty of every other person under a general rule 
if she did not have such a duty. 
 26. Id. at 261.  
 27. See Holtermann, Getting Real or Staying Positive: Legal Realism(s), Legal 
Positivism and the Prospects of Naturalism in Jurisprudence, supra note 5, at 543–44; See 
also ROSS, supra note 9, at 9–10; See also Ross’s early criticism of Kelsen, Alf Ross, The 
25th Anniversary of the Pure Theory of Law, 31 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 248–49 
(2011). 
 28. Loosely defined, behaviourism is the view that human phenomena can be 
accurately studied only through objectively observable behavioural events, as opposed to 
internal events like thinking or feeling. 
 29. Thus, in the Danish version of On Law and Justice, Ross writes on the 
epistemological difficulties presented by a parallel directive found in the Danish Bills of 
Exchange Act: “. . . what is a ‘duty’, and how do we ascertain empirically that it has been 
established?  The acceptance which takes place by drawing some strokes of ink on a piece of 
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that Ross-style legal science had indeed failed “to mark and explain the 
crucial distinction between mere regularities of human behaviour and 
rule-governed behaviour” exactly as Hart claimed.30 
I submit, however, that this reading of Ross’s considerations on 
the possibility of legal science is wrong.  Looking carefully at the text, 
it is, as we shall see in the following, undeniable that Ross explicitly 
countenances the invocation of mental entities over and beyond 
observable behaviour.  As we shall see, he does so through the 
adoption of an approach not only strikingly similar to the one later 
adopted by Hart (as outlined above) but also motivated by virtually the 
same considerations, i.e. the full recognition that austere behaviourism 
cannot distinguish rule bound behaviour from other kinds of regular 
behaviour. 
In order to illustrate the problems facing behaviourism, Ross 
introduces a very rewarding chess analogy which Hart passes by in 
almost complete silence.
31
  Ross asks us to imagine ourselves watching 
a game of chess and trying to understand the rules without any prior 
knowledge.
32
  The pressing epistemological concern is how we should 
proceed in order to establish such knowledge.  Or as Ross writes: 
“How is it possible then to establish which rules (directives) govern the 
game of chess?”33 And he continues: 
One could perhaps think of approaching the problem from the 
behaviourist angle— limiting oneself to what can be established by 
external observation of the actions and then finding certain 
regularities.
34
 
The problem is, however, just as Hart observed, that any attempt 
to determine the rules from such an external point of view remains 
underdetermined by the data: we can never tell whether a regularity 
found in the game is determined by the rules of chess or merely the 
manifestation of custom:
35
 
But in this way an insight into the rules of the game would never be 
achieved.  It would never be possible to distinguish actual custom, 
or even regularities conditioned by the theory of the game, from the 
 
paper does not appear to count among its observable effects anything that can be termed 
‘duty.’”  Ross, Om ret og retfærdighed : En indførelse i den analytiske retsfilosofi, at 16. 
1953, my translation. 
 30. See Hart, supra note 8 at 13. 
 31. In fact, Hart at one point applies the exact same analogy and for virtually the same 
purposes, i.e. in order to illustrate the insufficiency of the external perspective to the study 
of rules.  HART, supra note 4, at 56–57.  
 32. See Ross, supra note 9, at 11. 
 33. ROSS, supra note 9, at 15.  
 34. Id. at 15.  
 35. Custom is used here as synonymous with habit, not as a source of law. 
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rules of chess proper.  Even after watching a thousand games it 
would still be possible to believe that it is against the rules to open 
with a rook’s pawn.
36
 
From these considerations Ross’s conclusion appears 
unmistakable:  “Thus we cannot but adopt an introspective method.”37 
Consequently the rules of chess are analysed as a two-sided 
phenomenon which at least looks quite similar to Hart’s internal and 
external aspects of social rules: 
Accordingly we can say: a rule of chess ‘is valid’ means that within 
a given fellowship [. . .] this rule is effectively adhered to, because 
the players feel themselves to be socially bound by the directive 
contained in the rule.  The concept of validity (in chess) involves 
two elements.  The one refers to the actual effectiveness of the rule 
which can be established by outside observation.  The other refers 
to the way in which the rule is felt to be motivating, that is, socially 
binding.
38
 
Transferred to the scientific study of law, Ross’s conclusion 
regarding the insufficiency of austere behaviourism is equally clear: 
What is valid law cannot be ascertained by purely behaviouristic 
means, that is, by external observation of regularities in the 
reactions (customs) of the judges. [. . .] 
A behaviouristic interpretation, then, achieves nothing.  The 
changing behaviour of the judge can only be comprehended and 
predicted through ideological interpretation, that is, by means of the 
hypothesis of a certain ideology which animates the judge and 
motivates his actions. 
[. . .] [L]aw presupposes, not only regularity in the judge’s mode of 
action, but also his experience of being bound by the rules.  In the 
concept of validity two points are involved: partially the outward 
observable and regular compliance with a pattern of action, and 
partly the experience of this pattern of action as being a socially 
binding norm.
39
 
One might object that in thus banning pure behaviourism Ross is 
in fact contradicting his own empiricist position.  I shall get back to this 
point below (section IV.A).  Suffice to say here that it is preferable, on 
account of charity, to opt for an interpretation of his general 
epistemological commitments that is compatible with key passages like 
those above from the opening chapters of his book.  We cannot simply 
infer from Ross’s programmatic allegiance to logical positivism that he 
 
 36. ROSS, supra note 9, at 15 (emphasis added). 
 37. Id. (emphasis added). 
 38. Id. at 16 (emphasis added). 
 39. Id. at 37; see, e.g., Id. at 73. 
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must hold this or that view on the study of law.  When it comes to a full 
determination of Ross’s epistemological stance the proof of the 
pudding is in the eating. 
On the basis of the account so far it would therefore appear fair to 
conclude that any failure regarding the issue of rule-governed vs. mere 
habitual behavioural regularities cannot be ascribed to Ross somehow 
overlooking the distinction between these two social phenomena.  On 
the contrary, as we have seen, Ross is fully aware of that very 
distinction, and of its importance for legal science.  And most 
importantly, he tries to capture this by means apparently similar to 
those later adopted by Hart; i.e. by supplementing the external 
behaviourist approach with an internal, or, in Ross’s terminology, 
introspective method. 
III.  HART’S OBJECTION # 2: THE PROBLEM WITH “FEELINGS”; OR HOW 
ROSS FUNDAMENTALLY MISINTERPRETS THE INTERNAL ASPECTS OF 
SOCIAL RULES 
From this it seems that any charge of failure against Ross must 
take instead the shape of an argument that in spite of his explicit 
recognition of the problem and his attempt to develop the necessary 
methodological tools to manage it, he—unlike Hart—nevertheless 
fails.  And in so far that this is the real claim we should expect a 
demonstration how, in spite of the apparent similarities found so far, 
there are in fact substantial differences between Ross and Hart.  
Furthermore, we should expect those differences to be sufficiently 
important to justify not only the claim that Hart’s adoption of the 
distinction between internal and external aspects “famously 
demolished” Ross’s research program in legal philosophy but also the 
common perception that legal philosophy owes any important insights 
captured by that distinction to Hart. 
Indeed, on closer inspection this appears to better capture Hart’s 
argument.  Thus, Hart admits elsewhere that Ross in fact did not 
commit the simple error sometimes ascribed to him of overlooking the 
distinction between rule-governed and habitual behaviour and of 
equating legal rules with regular behaviour: 
Ross is right in thinking that we must distinguish an internal as 
well as an external aspect of the phenomenon presented by the 
existence of social rules.  This is true and very important for the 
understanding of any kind of rule.
40
 
The problem is rather that Ross gives an inaccurate picture of the 
 
 40. Hart, Scandinavian Realism, supra note 4, at 237. 
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internal aspect of social rules:  “[U]nfortunately he draws the line 
between these aspects in the wrong places.”41  In particular, he 
“misrepresents the internal aspect of rules as a matter of ‘emotion’ or 
‘feeling’—as a special psychological ‘experience.’”42  And in this light, 
it seems reasonable that Hart later described his review of Ross’s On 
Law and Justice as being primarily an attempt to explain “the 
important differences between ‘mere feelings of being bound’ which 
Ross includes in his analysis, and the internal point of view of one who 
accepts a rule.”43 
In explaining these differences, Hart stresses the importance of 
full recognition of the normative uses of legal language for a proper 
understanding of the internal aspect of legal rules: 
They [members of a group that has rules] [. . .] treat deviations as a 
reason for such reaction and demands for conformity as justified. 
When a pattern of behaviour is thus taken as a standard the 
criticism of conduct in terms of it and the claims and justifications 
based on it are expressed by the distinctive normative vocabulary 
of ‘ought,’ ‘must,’ ‘should,’ ‘may,’ ‘right,’ ‘wrong,’ and special 
variants like ‘duty’ and ‘obligation.’  The forms ‘I (you, he, they) 
ought to do that’ and ‘I (you, etc.) ought not to have done that’ are 
the most general ones used to discharge these critical normative 
functions which indeed constitute their meaning.
44
 
In Hart’s view, however, Ross’s talk of “feelings of compulsion” 
fails to track this kind of normative discourse: 
[T]he internal character of these statements is not a mere matter of 
the speaker having certain ‘feelings of compulsion’; for though 
these may indeed often accompany the making of such statements 
they are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions of their 
normative use in criticising conduct, making claims, and justifying 
hostile reactions by reference to the accepted standard.
45
 
As we shall see further below (IV.E), much depends for this line 
of reasoning on what exactly is meant by the elusive term “feelings,” 
and in particular on whether Ross by using it intended to exclude 
anything like the normative uses of language alluded to by Hart.  
Suffice to note here, that Hart seems simply to take for granted that 
Ross’s professed empiricist starting point implies that he cannot “allow 
for the internal non-factual, non-predictive uses of language 
 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. 
 43. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 8, at 14. 
 44. Hart, Scandinavian Realism, supra note 4, at 238; See also HART, supra note 4, at 
57. 
 45. Hart, Scandinavian Realism, supra note 4, at 238. 
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inseparable from the use of rules,”46 (i.e. the uses of language which 
according to Hart in the above quote is characterized by “the distinctive 
normative vocabulary of ‘ought,’ ‘must,’ ‘should,’ ‘may,’ ‘right,’ 
‘wrong,’ and special variants like ‘duty’ and ‘obligation.’”)  And 
correspondingly, he accuses Ross of creating, with his talk of feelings, 
“the impression that what Kelsen terms ‘ought-propositions’ may be 
dispensed with in the analysis of legal thinking.”47 
Again, this interpretation of Ross may not be entirely 
unmotivated.  Taking into account what Hart refers to as Ross’s 
“misplaced affection for the battle cry of ‘meaningless’”48 and recalling 
Ross’s fierce attack on natural law,49 it would seem that by adopting an 
introspective method in addition to behaviourism he has already come 
dangerously close to “metaphysics.”  Any acceptance, in addition, of 
“ought-propositions,” i.e. of normative statements asserting what 
behaviour is legal required of us, it seems, would irretrievably betray 
his epistemological starting point in logical positivism.  For that reason 
it would seem that the only analysis of the internal aspect compatible 
with Ross’s empiricism is one that, under the heading “judges’ 
normative ideology,” dissolves this entire aspect into one massive blob 
of blind “feelings of compulsion”—impermeable to analysis and 
impossible to sketch out in phenomenological depth or detail. 
And we can also understand why on this interpretation of Ross 
Hart can take his own version of the internal aspect to be 
fundamentally different.  Given Hart’s background in the 
(epistemologically speaking) more liberal Austinian ordinary language 
philosophy he can simply declare that “[t]he dimensions of legal 
language are far richer than this allows. . . . ‘[O]ught-propositions’ and 
other forms of normative internal statements are both necessary and 
harmless in the analysis of legal thinking . . .”50 
IV.  ROSS ON THE INTERNAL2-EXTERNAL2: NORM-EXPRESSIVE AND 
NORM-DESCRIPTIVE PROPOSITIONS 
While we can perhaps follow Hart’s reasons for interpreting Ross 
this way, and while we may even find the criticism well founded with 
regard to the quite rigid behaviourist position which Ross held in the 
early years of his career,
51
 Hart’s reading nevertheless fails to properly 
appreciate the richness and subtlety of Ross’s position from 1953 
 
 46. Id. at 238. 
 47. Id. at 237.  
 48. Id. at 235. 
 49. See Ross, supra note 9, at 261. 
 50. Id. at 239. 
 51. See, e.g., Ross, The 25th Anniversary of the Pure Theory of Law, supra note 24. 
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onwards.  As it turns out, there is in fact nothing in Ross’s mature legal 
philosophy to keep him from acknowledging such “ought-
propositions” or admitting other forms of normative internal statements 
in his analysis of legal thinking.  And the widespread failure to observe 
this is arguably illustrative of the dangers of performing exegesis of 
individual thinkers on the broad level of general “isms” instead of 
paying close attention to the distinctiveness of their actual writings.
52
 
More precisely, Ross can include these aspects because of his 
acute appreciation of a different kind of “internal” and “external” 
distinction than the one Hart points to.  This distinction is too often 
overlooked or at least only partly comprehended even though its 
significance can hardly be overestimated in the study of Ross’s legal 
philosophy—or in legal philosophy generally.  And, as we shall see, 
Hart’s failure to observe that particular distinction in Ross’s writings 
bears witness to his own general failure to appreciate it, at least in 
1961, when in The Concept of Law he repeatedly conflates this 
distinction with the one he invoked in order to tell the difference 
between regular and rule-based behaviour.
53
 
In Ross’s terminology this second internal-external distinction (in 
addition to the one already considered between the application of 
behaviourist and introspective method) is the distinction between 
norm-descriptive and norm-expressive propositions.  In a key passage 
Ross outlines the basic idea thus: 
Since the doctrinal study [of law] is concerned with norms it can be 
called normative.  But the term must not be misunderstood. . . . 
[C]ognitive propositions can naturally not be made up of norms 
(directives).  They have to consist of assertions—assertions 
concerning norms, which again means assertions to the effect that 
certain norms are of the nature of ‘valid law.’  The normative 
character of the doctrinal study of law signifies, therefore, that it is 
a doctrine concerning norms, and not of norms.  It does not aim at 
‘setting up’ or expressing norms, but at establishing their character 
of ‘valid law.’  The doctrinal study of law is normative in the sense 
of norm descriptive and not in the sense of norm expressive.
54
 
It may not be immediately clear what is captured by a distinction 
between two such kinds or modes of normativity-talk, or how 
propositions of legal science could suddenly be transformed into 
 
 52. Alternatively, one could say that the problem is one of ignoring or over-simplifying 
the various isms.  In Ross’s case it is presumably a combination of both since logical 
positivism was not completely uniform as a movement.  I shall get back to this point below. 
 53. See in particular Hart, supra note 4, at 84-88 and associated endnote at 291.  The 
endnote mentions the relevant distinction but Hart’s general argument proceeds in apparent 
disregard thereof. 
 54. ROSS, supra note 9, at 19 (last emphasis added). 
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epistemologically safe assertions if they only stay on the ‘norm-
descriptive’ side of the gap. 
For illustration, imagine six-year-old Ellen has been exposed to 
Norse folklore, and one day around Christmas says to her father: “We 
ought to leave some rice pudding in the attic for the pixie.”  In spite of 
Ellen’s sincerity, we may safely assume that her claim is not true.  We 
do not as a matter of fact have any duties toward imaginary creatures 
like pixies.  However, imagine that later the same day Ellen’s father 
tells his wife: “Ellen believes that we ought to leave some rice pudding 
in the attic for the pixie.”  In virtue of this small addition, the case is 
completely changed.  This is so because, in contrast to the first 
statement, the truth value of the latter is entirely independent of the 
existence or not of duties toward imaginary creatures.  It depends 
solely upon whether or not Ellen actually believes in the existence of 
such a duty.  And this is ultimately a psychological question regarding 
her beliefs, not a normative (i.e. norm expressive) question about the 
existence of duties toward pixies. 
 
Figure 1. The relation between Ellen’s own norm-expressive 
and her father’s norm-descriptive statement. 
 
This analogy illustrates an insight traditionally attributed to 
Gottlob Frege
55
: if a given proposition P (where P can be both an 
 
 55. Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) was a German philosopher, logician, and 
mathematician who is often accredited with having provided the foundations for modern 
logic. See, e.g., Edward N. Zalta, Gottlob Frege, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed. 2016). 
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assertion and a directive) is embedded in a so-called propositional 
attitude report (i.e. in a sentence stating that an agent A believes that, 
claims that, feels that, etc. P), the truth value of that particular 
proposition has no bearing on the truth value of the compound 
proposition, i.e. the propositional attitude report.
56
  Whether or not 
things actually are the way A believes, claims, feels, etc., is irrelevant 
to the truth of the whole propositional attitude report.  In such contexts 
the question is instead whether or not A in fact bears the kind of 
attitude toward P asserted in the report, i.e. whether or not she actually 
believes, claims, feels, etc. that things are/ought to be in the way stated 
in the proposition. 
And it is precisely this shift in truth values following the 
introduction of a propositional attitude context which Ross refers to 
when he insists that legal science should be norm-descriptive and not 
norm-expressive.
57
  A norm-expressive statement, then, is a statement 
that directly expresses acceptance or endorsement (if only 
hypothetically) of a given legal norm.  A norm-descriptive statement, 
by contrast, inserts a propositional attitude context around this legal 
norm and thus renders the truth-value of it (or lack thereof) immaterial 
to the truth value of the compound norm-descriptive proposition.  Or, 
to use Ross’s linguistic categories: the latter is a directive while the 
former is an assertion stating that a particular attitudinal relation exists 
between an agent and that directive. 
In order to comprehend the full implications of this paraphrasing 
of the propositions of legal doctrine into norm-descriptive 
propositions, i.e. into propositional attitude reports, we should observe 
how Ross answers three questions that are pertinent whenever such 
reports are made: To whom are we ascribing the attitude? What kind of 
attitude are we ascribing? And toward which proposition are we 
ascribing it? 
As to the first of these questions, Ross holds that the bearer of the 
relevant propositional attitude is the judiciary in the jurisdiction under 
scrutiny.
58
  It is the judges’ beliefs or feelings regarding legal directives 
that should be studied by the legal scholar and not, e.g., those of 
lawyers generally or of ordinary citizens for that matter.
59
 
As to the third question, Ross, unlike Hart but like Kelsen, 
believes that the legal norms relevant to the doctrinal study of law are 
those that are directed to the judges, and which prescribe how they 
 
 56. See GOTTLOB FREGE, ON SENSE AND REFERENCE, IN BASIC TOPICS IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 149 (Robert M. Harnish ed., Revised Edition, 1994). 
 57. See Ross, supra note 9, at 19. 
 58. It should be emphasized that groups can also be bearers of propositional attitudes. 
 59. See, e.g., ROSS, supra note 9, at 35. 
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should exercise their authority in cases falling under these norms .
60
 
Answering the second of these questions is more difficult, 
especially in the context of Hart’s criticism.  As we have seen, Ross 
believes that besides the actual behavioural effectiveness (which a legal 
rule shares with a habit), its validity consists in ‘the way in which the 
rule is felt to be motivating, that is, socially binding.
61
  In other words, 
the propositional attitude attributed to the judges seems to be 
something like: “[judge A] feels that [rule X] is motivating/socially 
binding.”  As we also saw, Hart believed that this attitude differs 
crucially from the critical reflective attitude which he ascribed to the 
internal perspective, and which could be stated along these lines: 
“[judge A] accepts as a standard of behaviour that [rule X].”62  In 
section IV.E I shall get back to whether Hart is right about this, but this 
has no bearing on the fact that we should read Ross’s norm-descriptive 
propositions as propositional attitude reports on judges’ attitudes 
towards legal norms. 
Following Ross’s paraphrasing from norm-expressive to norm-
descriptive propositions, then, the doctrinal study of law is no longer a 
study of how judges ought to behave in their capacity as judges (let 
alone how ordinary citizens ought to behave).  Just like Ellen’s father 
who only speaks about how Ellen believes they ought to behave vis-à-
vis pixies, the Rossian legal realist only speaks about how judges 
believe they ought to behave qua judges; about which rights and duties 
they believe that they have (and hence, but only indirectly, which rights 
and duties they believe that the citizens have).  In Ross’s words: 
A national law system, considered as a valid system of norms, can 
accordingly be defined as the norms which actually are operative in 
the mind of the judge, because they are felt by him to be socially 
binding and therefore obeyed.
63
 
In his examples Ross is consistently careful to emphasise this 
paraphrasing terminologically.  Thus he writes “that every proposition 
occurring in the doctrinal study of law contains as an integral part the 
concept ‘valid (Illinois, California, common, etc.) law.’”64  This 
phrasing emphasises that propositions of legal science must be 
indexicalised: they must be propositions about the beliefs of a 
particular group of people regarding a particular field; i.e., about the 
 
 60. See, e.g., Id. at 33, 52–53.  Ross stresses that an additional aspect of these norms is 
to “give rise to a reflex effect” in the general public and thus that they can also be said to be 
(indirectly) directed at them.  See, e.g., Id. at 52–54. 
 61. Id. at 16. 
 62. See Hart, Scandinavian Realism, supra note 4, at 238. 
 63. ROSS, supra note 9, at 35. 
 64. Id. at 11. 
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beliefs of (Illinois, Californian, common, etc.) judges regarding 
(Illinois, Californian, common, etc.) law.  This addition may 
occasionally be tacitly implied but it can never be thought away 
entirely—lest the propositional attitude context and hence the actual 
possibility condition of legal knowledge disappear entirely.  In other 
words, adding “. . . is valid (Illinois, Californian, common, etc.) law” is 
a way for the legal scholar to say “not my words” about the 
epistemologically problematic directives.  Instead, these words (plus 
adhering beliefs/feelings) are carefully placed in the mouths (and 
minds) of judges.
65
 
 
Figure 2. The relation between the judge’s norm-expressive and 
the legal scientist’s norm-descriptive statement. 
A. Sacrificing Empiricism? 
Returning to the earlier mentioned worry as to the compatibility of 
Ross’s general epistemological commitments with the details of his 
theory, it might be objected that such propositions about judges’ 
convictions about rights and duties (in Ross’s words: about “the 
ideology of the sources of law which in fact animates the courts”66) run 
 
 65. Ross does not refer to Frege on these issues but his writings are consistent 
throughout with a full appreciation of Frege’s discovery.  On the importance of reading 
Ross’s work in this light and his statements of valid law as propositional attitude reports, see 
Jakob v.H. Holtermann, Introduktion, in Om ret og retfærdighed : En indførelse i den 
analytiske retsfilosofi (A. Ross ed. 2013); See also Holtermann, Naturalizing Alf Ross’s 
Legal Realism: A Philosophical Reconstruction, supra note 5. 
 66. ROSS, supra note 9, at 76. 
We are obligated to 
order the acceptor of a 
negotiable instrument to 
pay it according to the 
tenor of his acceptance. 
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into exactly the same kind of epistemological difficulties which 
crippled natural law.  After all, how do we know what people actually 
believe or feel?  This, it seems, is private too. 
Ross does not deny the existence of epistemological difficulties in 
this area.  But in contrast to the difficulties facing natural law he does 
not consider them fatal—for reasons that bear witness to the balanced 
and moderate version of empiricism which he subscribes to at the end 
of the day.  Thus, Ross writes: 
If, in spite of all, prediction is possible, it must be because the 
mental process by which the judge decides to base his decision on 
one rule rather than another is not a capricious and arbitrary matter, 
varying from one judge to another, but a process determined by 
attitudes and concepts, a common normative ideology, present and 
active in the minds of judges when they act in their capacity as 
judges.  It is true that we cannot observe directly what takes place 
in the mind of the judge, but it is possible to construct hypotheses 
concerning it, and their value can be tested simply by observing 
whether predictions based on them have come true.
67
 
Returning to the analogy, if Ellen believes in the existence of 
duties toward Christmas pixies she will presumably behave accordingly 
around Christmas: she will remind her father to buy rice in the super 
market, to prepare it when they get home etc.  And if a judge feels that 
the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, s. 62 is socially binding she 
will behave accordingly if a case fulfilling the conditions specified in 
that act is brought before her court: she will order the acceptor to pay.
68
 
It is in view of these considerations that Ross’s theory of valid law 
becomes a predictive theory: it becomes a set of predictions of judges’ 
behaviour under certain specified conditions based on their beliefs 
about rules.  Thus, in Ross’s final analysis an assertion A made in the 
doctrinal study of law that a given directive D is valid (Illinois, 
California, common, etc.) law, becomes: 
. . . a prediction to the effect that if an action in which the 
conditioning facts given in the section are considered to exist is 
brought before the courts of this state, and if in the meantime there 
have been no alterations in the circumstances which form the basis 
of A, the directive to the judge contained in the section will form an 
 
 67. Id. at 75 (emphasis added).  The Danish version contains an additional analogous 
passage which is omitted from the English translation.  See Ross, Om ret og retfærdighed : 
En indførelse i den analytiske retsfilosofi, at 50. 1953. 
 68. This is also why Aarnio is wrong when he claims that “[t]his very element in the 
Rossian prediction theory [that his theory is both behaviourist as well as idealist] necessarily 
leads to a non-positivist final conclusion: The doctrinal study of law is interpretative, or if 
preferred, hermeneutic, and not empirical as to its nature.”  Aulis Aarnio, Legal Realism 
Reinterpreted, in ESSAYS ON THE DOCTRINAL STUDY OF LAW 94  (Aulis Aarnio ed. 2011). 
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integral part of the reasoning underlying the judgment.
69
 
And more generally, the entire doctrinal study of law becomes a 
theory about “the aggregate of factors which exercise influence on the 
judge’s formulation of the rule on which he bases his decision.”70  
Ultimately, these factors can be subsumed under four sources of law: 
legislation, precedent, custom, and the tradition of culture (“reason”).71 
B. Dispensing with “Ought-Propositions” in the Analysis of Legal 
Thinking? 
Consider if we read Ross’s distinction between norm-expressive 
and norm-descriptive utterances as covering the distinction between 
(hypothetically) endorsing/accepting a given directive and making a 
propositional attitude report concerning the cognitive relations certain 
people (i.e. Illinois, California, common, etc. judges) hold to that 
directive.  Then, we see clearly why it is wrong when Hart claims that 
Ross creates “the impression that what Kelsen terms ‘ought-
propositions’ may be dispensed with in the analysis of legal 
thinking,”72 and when he claims that Ross does not “allow for the 
internal non-factual, non-predictive uses of language inseparable from 
the use of rules.”73  Properly understood, such propositions are not 
dispensed with, nor are the non-predictive uses of such language not 
allowed for.  On the contrary, they survive wholly intact.  In fact, 
Ross’s analysis illustrates very clearly why such propositions are 
literally indispensable in the analysis of legal thinking: without them 
there would be no propositional attitude to report precisely because 
such a report presupposes full awareness of the existence of “the 
internal non-factual, non-predictive uses of language inseparable from 
the use of rules,” viz. in the minds and mouths of the judges. 
So Ross has no problem agreeing with Hart that “‘ought-
propositions’ and other forms of normative internal statements are both 
 
 69. ROSS, supra note 9, at 42. 
 70. Id. at 77. 
 71. See Id. at 75-107.  This is also why validity, to Ross, becomes a matter of degree, 
i.e. varying with the degree of probability with which it can be predicted that a given 
directive will influence the judge’s reasoning process and hence her decision. See Id. At 44-
45.  So also on this issue does Ross’s model for legal science imitate that of natural science, 
where uncertainty and probability are widely recognized as the modalities of scientific 
propositions.  This is unlike Kelsen, who found this particular idea in Ross’s work 
preposterous.  Cf. Hans Kelsen, Eine ‘Realistische’ und die Reine Rechtslehre. 
Bemerkungen zu Alf Ross: On Law and Justice, 10 Österreichische Zeitschrift für 
Öffentliches Recht (1959-60). 
 72. Hart, Scandinavian Realism, supra note 4, at 237. 
 73. Id. at 238. 
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necessary and harmless in the analysis of legal thinking.”74  They are 
necessary because without them Ross’s model for expressions of valid 
law simply would not make sense.  Without the “ought-
proposition”/directive there would be nothing for the propositional 
attitude report to be about!  And they are harmless because they are 
embedded in the epistemologically safe propositional attitude context 
which renders their alleged lack of truth value unproblematic.
75
 
C. Misrepresenting “Valid Law” in the Mouths of Judges? 
By the same token we see why Hart’s perhaps best known 
objection to Ross is equally mistaken.  Hart insists that “even if in the 
mouth of the ordinary citizen or lawyer ‘this is a valid rule of English 
law’ is a prediction of what a judge will do, say, and/or feel, this cannot 
be its meaning in the mouth of a judge who is not engaged in predicting 
his own or others’ behaviour or feelings.”76 
First, we should notice that Ross does not claim that the above 
analysis of the meaning of “valid law” matches perfectly with the 
meaning of that term in ordinary usage—not among legal scholars, 
judges or lawyers, nor among ordinary citizens.  But unlike Hart, Ross 
is clearly not interested in ordinary usage of this or any other legal 
terms per se.  His goal is epistemological, i.e. to show how the 
doctrinal study of law can be possible as a science.
77
  Following this 
precept, Ross’s definition of “valid law” is rather explicative in 
Carnap’s sense78; it is a technical term serving the philosophical goals 
which Ross is pursuing.  And for that purpose, ordinary usage is no 
guide, and the mere possibility of different meanings of the same term 
cannot per se constitute a challenge.
79
 
 
 74. Id. at 239. 
 75. The same error is committed in MICHAEL D. A. FREEMAN, LLOYD’S 
INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 1044 (8th ed. 2008); See also Joseph Raz, The Purity of 
the Pure Theory of Law, in NORMATIVITY AND NORMS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
KELSENIAN THEMES 239 (Stanley L. Paulson & Bonnie Litschewski Paulson eds., Revised 
Edition, 1998).  Speaking, as Raz does, of “legal statements,” they can be both normative 
and descriptive—or more accurately, they can be both norm-expressive and norm-
descriptive according to Ross.  It is only the statements of legal science that have to be non-
normative, i.e. norm-descriptive. 
 76.  Hart, Scandinavian Realism, supra note 4, at 237. 
 77. See Ross, supra note 9. 
 78. RUDOLF CARNAP, MEANING AND NECESSITY: A STUDY IN SEMANTICS AND 
MODAL LOGIC, 7–8 (1947). 
 79. Unfortunately, this programmatic ambition on the part of Ross is completely 
obscured in the current English translation.  To illustrate, the following passage which in the 
Danish edition states this ambition clearly lacks entirely the central words in the English 
version (which I have added in brackets and underlined): 
The foregoing analysis [of the concept of ‘valid Danish law’] has aimed at 
interpreting the real content of propositions which [according to their meaning and 
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But this does not mean that Ross cannot simultaneously recognise 
the actual occurrence of other meanings in ordinary use—which he in 
fact does.
80
  In particular, he acknowledges the widespread usage of 
‘valid law’ in a meaning wholly different from the technical 
portmanteau way of making propositional attitude reports elaborated 
above.
81
  And in such contexts (for ease of expression we could call 
this meaning “valid2”—as distinguished from “valid1” referring to the 
specific kind of propositional attitude report described above) “valid 
law” is used roughly as an analogue of “true” or “correct” and serves to 
express the speakers endorsement or acceptance of a given legal 
directive. 
Of course, qua logical positivist Ross takes any such usage to be 
ill-founded and unscientific but he unquestionably does recognise its 
existence as a real legal phenomenon (reservations being made for 
what Hart rightly describes as Ross’s “misplaced affection for the 
battle-cry ‘meaningless’”, to which I shall return in the next section).  
In fact, throughout On Law and Justice Ross repeatedly uses “valid 
law” in this meaning of the word in order to characterise precisely the 
(in his view) mistaken perception on the part of natural lawyers and 
legal positivists as to the epistemological status of their propositions of 
law.
82
 
 
intention] have the character of [scientific] assertions that a certain rule is valid 
Danish law. 
Another question is the extent to which the doctrinal study of law in the form in 
which it exists in current expositions of national law systems does in fact consist 
of assertions of this kind.  It is the question of the extent to which the doctrinal 
study is and will be a cognition of [/a science about] valid law in the sense in 
which it has been defined in the foregoing analysis.’  ROSS, supra note 9, at 45–
46.  
For discussion of the unfortunate role played by the original English translation of 
ON LAW AND JUSTICE and for a correct appreciation of this aspect of Ross’s 
theory, see JAKOB V. H. HOLTERMANN, “THIS CANNOT BE ITS MEANING IN THE 
MOUTH OF THE JUDGE”: THE CASE FOR THE NEW ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
TRANSLATION OF ALF ROSS’S ON LAW AND JUSTICE FORTHCOMING ON OXFORD 
UNIVERSITY PRESS,, 20 Utopía y praxis latinoamericana : revista internacional de 
filosofía iberoamericana y teoría social (2015). 
 80. Ross’s appreciation of the discrepancy between ordinary usage and his own 
technical suggestion is also clearly expressed in Alf Ross, Book Review, 45 CAL. L. REV. 
564, 568 (1957) (reviewing Hans Kelsen, WHAT IS JUSTICE? JUSTICE, LAW AND POLITICS 
IN THE MIRROR OF SCIENCE: COLLECTED ESSAYS (1957); and in Danish in Alf Ross, Om 
begrebet ‘gældende ret’ hos Theodor Geiger, 63 TIDSSKRIFT FOR RETTSVITENSKAP, at 247–
48 (1950). 
 81. See Ross, supra, at ix, 3, 18, 31, 38, 45, 52-70, 92, 95, 105, 155-156, 158, 160, 179, 
229, 234, 238-239, 243, 248-249, 252, 263-264, 267, 275, 289, 291, 297-298, 300, 308, 311, 
313, 316, 347, 352, 354, 366. 
 82. “He [the judge] wishes to find a decision that shall not be the fortuitous result of 
mechanical manipulation of facts and paragraphs, but [. . .] something which is ‘valid.’”  
ROSS, supra note 9, at 99; See also Id. at 53–54, 68, 274–75, 366–67. 
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Admittedly, the presence of this second kind of validity is more 
easily overlooked in the English translation than in the Danish original, 
because two related though different words are naturally available in 
Danish to express this difference in meanings.  Thus, in the English 
edition the same term “valid law” is used as a translation both of 
“gyldig ret” which connotes “correct”/ “true law,” and of “gældende 
ret” which is closer in meaning to “law in effect”/ “law in force,” and 
which Ross reserves for the particular kind of propositional attitude 
report described above.
83
 
In spite of linguistic shortcomings, it is nevertheless 
understandable why Ross sounds somewhat nettled that Hart seems to 
have read Ross as if only valid1 were recognised and present to the 
exclusion of valid2.  Thus, throughout On Law and Justice Ross 
consistently places valid inside inverted commas when it is used in the 
non-technical meaning of valid2, i.e. when it connotes “true”/ 
“correct.”84  And when the inverted commas are absent it is always 
fairly obvious from the context which of the two is at play.  Thus, 
valid2 is reserved for contexts where the (according to Ross) mistaken 
cognitivist interpretations of the “legal consciousness” are discussed.  
Valid1, on the other hand, is consistently embedded in the formula: “. . . 
is valid (Illinois, California, common, etc.) law,” indicating that Ross is 
referring to the specific kind of propositional attitude report 
characteristic (ideally) of the scientific study of law. 
This clarification allows us to return to Hart’s objection that 
Ross’s predictive definition of valid law “cannot be its meaning in the 
mouth of a judge who is not engaged in predicting his own or others’ 
behaviour or feelings.”85  In The Concept of Law Hart specifies that the 
challenge occurs precisely with regard to “how the judge’s own 
 
 83. The lack of clarity on this point is part of the motivation for the new translation and 
second critical edition of ON LAW AND JUSTICE that is currently under preparation at Oxford 
University Press (forthcoming 2017); See also Holtermann, Utopía y praxis latinoamericana 
: revista internacional de filosofía iberoamericana y teoría social, (2015).  For useful general 
linguistic clarification, see Eng, supra note 6, at 198206.  Interestingly, Weber emphasized 
virtually the same distinction between two kinds of validity in R. Stammlers ‘Überwindung’ 
der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung, in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre 
(Max Weber & Johannes Winckelmann eds., 1988/1907), and in the English translation of 
that book Critique of Stammler (1977), one finds this distinction aptly expressed with the 
two terms empirical and axiological validity for validity1 and validity2 respectively.  See 
Jakob v. H. Holtermann & Mikael Rask Madsen, European New Legal Realism and 
International Law: How to Make International Law Intelligible, 28 LEIDEN J. OF INT'L L. 
211, 216–20 (2015).  
 84. See Ross, supra note 9, at ix, 3, 18, 31, 53. 55. 57. 65. 68, 70, 92, 105, 158, 160, 
179, 229, 263, 298, 308, 313, 366, 368, 370. 
 85. See Hart, Scandinavian Realism, supra note 4, at 237. 
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statement that a particular rule is valid functions in judicial decision,”86 
and in that particular situation it undeniably seems true that the judge is 
not stating a prediction.  Hart overlooks, however, that Ross does not 
have to claim this.  On the contrary, Ross can simply claim that the 
meaning of “valid law” in the mouth of the judge who finds herself in 
the specific situation Hart is referring to, is simply valid2, i.e. “correct” 
or “true.” 
In fact, Ross’s analysis of statements of valid law in terms of 
propositional attitude reports can be said not only to leave conceptual 
room for the use of valid2 but even to presuppose such usage.  For, as 
we have seen, this construction presupposes precisely a difference in 
meaning between the embedded proposition and the full propositional 
attitude report.  In order for the legal scholar to “mean” (i.e. assert) 
that: somebody (i.e. Illinois, California, common, etc. judges) feel that 
D is socially binding (alternatively: accepts as a standard of behaviour 
that D), which is the scientific meaning of “valid1,” she must 
presuppose that there is somebody (i.e. Illinois, California, common, 
etc. judges) that feels (and in that sense means) only that: D is thus 
binding.  Indeed, this is the very meaning of the propositional attitude 
report!  And one natural way for those judges to express that kind of 
attitude toward D would be to say that “D is valid” in the meaning 
valid2/“gyldig” i.e. is “true”/“correct.” 
In other words, instead of this second meaning of valid law 
contradicting Ross’s analysis as Hart claims it does, we see how it fits 
perfectly into his analysis of valid law as part of the propositional 
attitude report in the following way: a statement that: a given directive 
D is valid1 (Illinois, Californian, common, etc.) law is, in effect, a 
claim that: (Illinois, Californian, common, etc.) judges believe that D is 
valid2, i.e. “correct” or “true” (and hence binding).  In practice, of 
course, Ross wishes to avoid this formulation and use of valid2 
because, qua logical positivist, he believes that judges are wrong in so 
believing but this is a different issue. 
D. On Ross’s “Misplaced Affection for the Battle-Cry ‘Meaningless’” 
Admittedly, this interpretation of Ross’s position is open to one 
serious objection.  Hart was undeniably right that Ross had a 
“misplaced affection for the battle-cry ‘meaningless.’”  Several places 
in  On Law and Justice (as elsewhere in Ross’s writings) expressions 
like “valid” (i.e. valid2) and other normative words like “justice,” 
“duty,”, “right”, “promise”, etc. and directives more generally are 
 
 86. HART, supra note 4, at 105 (emphasis added). 
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triumphantly denounced as meaningless.
87
  And this fact seems not 
only to contradict any claim that there is a second, more inclusive 
meaning of validity at play in his work; it also seems to pinpoint an 
inconsistency in his more technical use of the word validity because it 
is not entirely clear how it is possible to hold any propositional attitude 
(except perhaps bafflement!) towards a literally meaningless 
proposition.
88
 
In other words, by insisting to use the word meaningless to 
describe all these traditional normative uses of language it does indeed 
seem that Ross has de facto barred himself from the use of “ought-
propositions” in the analysis of legal thinking, and thus from the 
possibility of sketching out in any real depth the phenomenology of the 
internal aspect of legal rules.
89
  All that can be assigned to the judge’s 
ideology, it seems, is indeed the abovementioned amorphous blob of 
feelings of compulsion. 
Again, however, I submit that the problem is only superficial; it 
disappears once we recognise the presence also of two meanings of 
meaning in his text.  On the one hand, Ross obviously adopts the 
austere logico-positivist usage where meaningful/meaningless mean 
simply verifiable/unverifiable respectively.  And this is undoubtedly 
the meaning (correspondingly, we could call this meaning1) which 
Ross applies whenever he invokes “the battle-cry of “meaningless.’” 
But on the other hand there is simultaneously a much more 
commonsensical concept of meaning at play in his writings; a meaning 
(~meaning2) that is much broader and more inclusive and which 
accepts as meaningful the same kinds of propositions as would almost 
any competent language user.  And this is precisely the meaning of 
meaning which Ross applies whenever he describes the 
phenomenology of the “internal aspect,” i.e. of the judicial ideology 
which is found when the legal scholar applies the introspective method.  
Because this entire ideology is indeed one of meaning: 
Thus the norms of chess are the abstract idea content (of a directive 
nature) which makes it possible, as a scheme of interpretation, to 
understand the phenomena of chess (the actions of the moves and 
the experienced patterns of action) as a coherent whole of meaning 
 
 87. See, e.g., Ross supra note 9, at 172, 174, 220, 249, 286. See also, e.g., Ross, Tû-Tû, 
70 Harvard Law Review 812 (1957). 
 88. This challenge could be considered a version of the so-called Frege-Geach 
problem.  See P.T. Geach, Assertion, THE PHIL. REV. 74 (1965).  In ongoing work I am 
looking more closely at this aspect. 
 89. Phenomenology is used here in the sense of the study/theory of structures of 
consciousness as experienced from the first-person perspective.  See, e.g., David Woodruff 
Smith, Gottlob Frege, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta ed. 
2016). 
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and motivation, a game of chess . . .
90
 
Correspondingly, Ross manifestly ascribes meaning even to 
directives that are not actually expressed (much less placed in 
propositional attitude contexts) but considered purely in abstraction: 
It is possible to abstract the meaning of an assertion purely as a 
thought content (‘2 and 2 make 4’) from the apprehension of the 
same by a given person at a given time; and in just the same way it 
is possible to abstract the meaning of a directive (‘the king has the 
power of moving one square in any direction’) from the concrete 
experience of the directive.  The concept ‘rule of chess’ must 
therefore in accurate analysis be divided into two: the experienced 
ideas of certain patterns of behaviour (with the accompanying 
emotions) and the abstract content of those ideas, the norms of 
chess.
91
 
If only the narrow ‘logical positivist’92 conception of meaning 
(meaning1) was at play, these claims would be senseless.  Their overt 
presence is a sign therefore not of a contradiction at the heart of Ross’s 
theory, but rather of the undogmatic character of his epistemological 
and semantic theory which leaves ample room also for a less technical 
concept of meaning alongside the more technical logico-positivist 
one.
93
  It is indeed true that he uses meaningless exactly as a battle-cry.  
And his affection for this battle-cry is indeed misplaced.  But this is not 
because Ross unjustly tries to define what is thus rendered 
“meaningless” out of existence.94  It is misplaced rather because in 
using it as a technical term signifying simply unjustifiability (more 
accurately: the lacking of truth value), Ross confounds things that 
ought to be kept apart, and in so doing, he gives sceptical readers an 
excuse to overlook the presence of a considerably less austere and 
fairly commonsensical concept of meaning and, hence, for 
misconstruing his theory. 
 
 90. ROSS, supra note 9, at 16 (emphasis added).  Numerous passages to the same 
effect, see, e.g., Id. at 12–13, 32, 74. 
 91. Id. at 16 (emphasis added).  This simultaneously illustrates the substantive 
movement in Ross’s thinking, because in 1936 he took the exact opposite view and flatly 
denied that any abstract meaningfulness could be ascribed to normative propositions.  See 
Ross, The 25th Anniversary of the Pure Theory of Law, supra note 24, at 249.  In other 
words, his earlier (anti-)semantics for normative propositions rendered conceptually 
impossible the Fregean move we find in On Law and Justice. 
 92. I place logical positivist in inverted commas here for reasons that will be clear 
immediately below. 
 93. Ross’s awareness of the technical or artificial character of the narrow concept of 
meaning as verification criteria is further emphasized by the fact that he sometimes refers to 
this kind of meaning as representative or logical meaning.  See, e.g., ROSS, supra note 9, at 
8. 
 94. See HART, supra note 4, at 91. 
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One might object to this interpretation that it makes Ross emerge 
as a confused and self-contradictory writer.  To state that he operated 
with two meanings of “meaning” could make him appear like someone 
who, when push comes to shove, cannot stick to his logical positivist 
principles—or just as someone who is not philosophically rigorous.95  
We should, however, remind ourselves that logical positivism as a 
movement was never completely uniform.  Especially from the early 
1930s onwards, the circle was divided precisely over the conception of 
meaning.
96
  Thus, a “conservative camp” organized around Moritz 
Schlick insisted on an uncompromising line sticking to a strict 
empiricist verificationist conception of meaning thus expelling 
everything unverifiable from the realm of meaning.
97
  However, a so-
called left wing organized around Otto Neurath and Rudolph Carnap 
took a more liberal approach.  Not only did they relax the verification 
principle in order to include so-called laws of nature (by definition 
extending beyond empirical observation) among statements that are 
verifiable and thus meaningful and potentially scientific.  They also 
admitted that statements that notoriously cannot honor even this 
relaxed notion of meaningful statements (so-called “metaphysical” 
statements, including normative—norm-expressive—statements), were 
not strictly speaking meaningless.
98
  They were only cognitively or 
empirically meaningless.  In other words, these left-wing members 
would, just like Ross, accept a distinction within the realm of the 
meaningful between the empirically or cognitively meaningful and 
other kinds of meaningful—although they would still banish the latter 
group from science and assign them to “metaphysics”.  (Liberal/left 
wing or not, they were after all still logical positivists.)
99
 
These considerations make clear what the unfortunate 
combination of Ross’s belligerent rhetoric and Hart’s uncharitable 
reading has managed to keep hidden for half a century: it is one thing 
to claim that normative and more generally metaphysical beliefs cannot 
be true or false; it is another thing altogether to claim that such beliefs 
are literally meaningless, and that we therefore live in a universe 
devoid of people holding them.  Ross obviously held the former view, 
 
 95. I am grateful to Dan Priel for pushing me on this point. 
 96. For a first-hand description of this debate, see Rudolf Carnap, Intellectual 
Autobiography, in The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap 3–86 (Paul Arthur Schilpp, ed. 1963). 
 97. Id. at 57-58. 
 98. Id. at 57-59. 
 99. Placing Ross within logical positivism’s left wing on this issue is further justified 
by the fact that Ross from 1934 onwards had an extensive correspondence with Neurath.  
The contents of this correspondence confirms that Neurath’s specific interpretation of 
logical positivism had a very substantive impact on Ross’s legal realism.  Jens Evald, Alf 
Ross - a life (DJØF Publishing. 2014). 
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but we now see that he did not hold the latter. 
E. Accepting Social Rules vs. Feeling that they are Socially Binding 
One remaining question is whether Hart was nevertheless right 
that theoretical differences remain between his critical reflective 
attitude characteristic of the internal aspect of rules and Ross’s 
“feelings of being bound.” 
We should note that unless Hart has some highly technical notions 
in mind he cannot consistently deny the existence of a necessary 
connection between the internal aspect and some kind of “feelings” or 
“experiences.”  As is clear from his criticism of the identification of 
rules with habits Hart is certainly no behaviourist.  A group of zombies 
cannot have rules on his account, no matter how well versed in 
normative lingo.  We see this, e.g., from the core passage of The 
Concept of Law where Hart discusses the relationship between the 
internal aspect of rules and feelings.  Here, he specifically does not 
identify this aspect with “criticism (including self-criticism), demands 
for conformity, [and with] acknowledgement that such criticism and 
demands are justified.”100  Instead, Hart states how this necessary 
attitudinal element of the internal aspect displays itself thus.  
Correspondingly, the critical reflective attitude does not consist in the 
use of “the normative terminology of ‘ought,’ ‘must,’ and ‘should,’ 
‘right’ and ‘wrong,’” but finds its characteristic expression thus.101 
It is hard to see what it could possibly be that displays itself, or 
finds its characteristic expression thus, if not some kind of 
psychological states among the members of the group.  Any attempt at 
an anti-mentalistic definition of acceptance and of the critical reflective 
attitude strictly in terms of use would arguably jeopardise Hart’s entire 
attempt to distinguish between following social rules and merely 
having convergent behaviour.  Verbal behaviour is also a kind of 
behaviour, and as such it can be studied purely from the outside.  We 
would therefore find no use for a distinct internal point of view.  So it 
seems that Hart after all is no Wittgenstein on matters of the mental.  
His internal aspect has to have an “inside,” there has to be a way that it 
“feels.”102 
This allows us to restate Hart’s objection more precisely: the 
problem with Ross’s account cannot simply be that it is 
phenomenological; it has to be that it is phenomenologically incorrect.  
 
 100. HART, supra note 4, at 57.  
 101. Id.  The same point can be seen indirectly from the fact that Hart acknowledges the 
theoretical possibility that otherwise perfect normative linguistic behaviour may in fact be 
“pretence” or “window dressing.”  Id. at 140. 
 102. At least for the majority.  Id. at 56. 
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So we have to look more specifically for a principled difference 
between Hart’s critical reflective attitude and the particular kind of 
feeling which Ross assigns to the judge.  And on this approach, Hart’s 
critical reflective attitude has at least three key features which might 
distinguish it from Ross’s “binding feelings.” 
First, the critical reflective attitude is social in that the attitudinist 
holds that the rule as a common public standard binds all members of 
the social group and herself merely qua such member.  This contrasts 
with the merely individual “psychological experiences analogues to 
those of restriction or compulsion”103 to which group members might 
refer “when they say they ‘feel bound’ to behave in certain ways.”104 
Second, instead of “feeling compelled” by the rule the 
attitudinist’s acceptance of it is in some sense a matter of free 
deliberation.  This is also what MacCormick refers to as the volitional 
element of the internal aspect.
105
 
Third, the critical reflective attitude is a cognizance.  That is to 
say, the attitudinist takes this social character to consist in or stem from 
the intersubjective verifiability or justifiability of the rule in question.  
Hart consistently casts his descriptions of the critical reflective attitude 
in epistemic terms.  He emphasises how the attitudinist “treat[s] 
deviations as a reason for such [adverse] reaction and demands for 
conformity as justified,”106 and how the attitudinist has to “think of his 
conforming behaviour as ‘right,’ ‘correct,’ or ‘obligatory.’”107 The 
attitudinist does not merely irrationally “feel” that one should conform 
to the standard; he “knows” it, or “has the right to be certain.” 
We may appreciate the contrast Hart is making here.  The problem 
is again, however, that the account with which he contrasts his own has 
very little in common with the view actually propounded by Ross.  On 
the contrary, in terms of characterising the phenomenology of 
following rules, Ross was substantially in agreement with and thus 
effectively preceded Hart on all three points. 
As to the first of these points (i.e. the social character of the 
critical reflective attitude) it is quite clear from Ross’s central chess 
analogy that he does not consider the internal, or in his terminology the 
ideological aspect of legal rules, to be merely a matter of individual 
 
 103. Id. at 57. 
 104. Id.; See also Hart, Scandinavian Realism, supra note 4, at 238.  Relatedly, Hart 
warns against regarding the rule of recognition not as a public, common standard of correct 
judicial decision, but as something which each judge merely obeys for his part only.  HART, 
supra note 4, at 115–16. 
 105. NEIL MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART, 47–48 (2d ed. 2008). 
 106. HART, supra note 4, at 238. 
 107. Id. at 115; See also Id. at 11, 55, 84, 90, 105, 140. 
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feelings which just happen to coincide among a majority of judges in a 
given jurisdiction.  Instead, he emphasises precisely the constitutive 
character of the social element: 
[F]ellowship is an essential factor in a game of chess. [. . .] [T]he 
aims and interests pursued and the actions conditioned by these can 
only be conceived of as a link in a greater whole which include the 
actions of another person. [. . .] 
Fellowship is also revealed in the intersubjective character of the 
rules of chess.  It is essential that they should be given the same 
interpretation, at least by the two players in a given game.  
Otherwise there would be no game, and the separate moves would 
remain in isolation with no coherent meaning.
108
 
Furthermore, Ross is quite eager to emphasise that the relevant 
“binding feeling” is precisely not a merely individual feeling of 
compulsion—and for virtually the same reasons as Hart: 
These directives are felt by each player to be socially binding; that 
is to say, a player not only feels himself spontaneously motivated 
(‘bound’) to a certain method of action but is at the same time 
certain that a breach of the rules will call forth a reaction (protest) 
on the part of his opponent.
109
 
This essentially social character of the relevant attitude also has a 
bearing on the second alleged point of contrast (i.e. on the distinction 
between compulsion and free deliberation), because it makes clear that 
Ross is not dealing with immediate feelings of compulsion but with 
only mediately binding feelings.  Furthermore, we should note that 
Ross rarely speaks literally of compulsion and only in contexts where 
he is stressing the emotional and hence irrational and unverifiable) 
character of judges’ beliefs.110  Elsewhere, he writes e.g. “the legal 
consciousness is, like the sense of morality, a disinterested attitude of 
approval or disapproval toward a social norm.”111  The judge is 
“motivated by disinterested impulses”112 or by “a normative ideology 
of a known content,”113 and he describes the judge as a “a human being 
who will carefully attend to his social task by making decisions which 
he feels to be ‘right’ in the spirit of the legal and cultural tradition.”114 
These passages are considerably closer to the terminology 
 
 108. ROSS, supra note 9, at 131. 
 109. Id. at 14 (emphasis added). 
 110. Id. at 16 – where Ross speaks only indirectly about judges through the analogy of 
chess players. 
 111. Id. at 369 (emphasis added). 
 112. Id. at 53. 
 113. Id. at 74. 
 114. ROSS, supra note 9, at 131 (emphasis added). 
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preferred by Hart, and they arguably make it more difficult to uphold 
the image of the relevant Rossian feelings as unconditional all-or-
nothing compulsive states which obsessively dominate the judge’s 
mind and force her to reach a particular decision.  On the contrary, 
Ross explicitly states in his canonical formulation of the predictive 
theory that a given rule’s being valid (i.e. that judges “feel bound” by 
it) means only that if the relevant pattern of behaviour is considered to 
exist in a case brought before the court, that rule “will form an integral 
part of the reasoning underlying the judgment.”115  In other words, the 
relevant feeling, the propositional attitude toward the individual legal 
rule, is one which allows of degrees: the attitude manifests itself in a 
pull in the judge’s comprehensive motivational structure but this pull 
may in individual cases be counterweighed or deflected by stronger 
pulls exerted by other rules which the judge also feels socially bound 
by, i.e. thinks are valid2.
116
 
Finally, on this second alleged point of contrast it seems that Hart 
too has to include some kind of bindingness in the rules.  If the critical 
reflective attitude is characterised by the attitudinist thinking “of his 
conforming behaviour as ‘right,’ ‘correct,’ or ‘obligatory,’”117 it is 
arguably hard to see how anyone can have such an attitude and still 
consider herself absolutely free to decide whether to conform or not.
118
  
To be sure, this force that binds the attitudinist is not literally 
compelling, but neither was, as we saw, the force which Ross 
countenanced (hence also inverted commas: “bound”). 
This brings us to the third of the alleged points of difference (i.e. 
the epistemic aspect of Hart’s critical reflective attitude).  For as it 
turns out, the kind of binding force which Hart thus has to admit the 
existence of (and which—together with the more relaxed understanding 
of Ross’s bindingness—undermines the picture of a sharp contrast 
between free and compulsive accounts of the internal aspect), stems 
precisely from this epistemic aspect.  The attitudinist feels “forced” to 
conform, i.e. considers a certain pattern of behaviour obligatory, 
precisely because she accepts a certain set of reasons which justify the 
rule.  In other words, she considers the rule “binding” in the same 
rather puzzling way in which we generally consider binding the 
 
 115. Id. at 42 (emphasis added). 
 116. In this respect (though of course not in others), Rossian rules are a lot like 
Dworkinean principles. 
 117. HART, supra note 4, at 115. 
 118. In fact, Ross already stressed this exact point in his review of Hart.  See Ross, 
Review of H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, supra note 10, at 1188; See also 
MACCORMICK, supra note 105, at 48; See also Brian Leiter, The Demarcation Problem in 
Jurisprudence: A New Case for Scepticism, 31 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 663, 672 (2011). 
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conclusion of a valid argument with true premises. 
Mindful of Ross’s criticism of natural law style cognitivism we 
might try, then, to restate the difference between the two relevant 
attitudes: they may both be social and they may both be considered 
binding only in a guarded or metaphorical sense, but could it be that 
Ross, unlike Hart, cannot countenance for the epistemic aspect 
characteristic of the internal aspect of rules? 
Thus stated, however, the objection overlooks that in spite of 
Ross’s norm-skepticism he actually also characterises the judicial 
propositional attitude as a kind of cognizance.  We already saw that 
Ross too thinks that the judge will try to make “decisions which he 
feels to be ‘right’ in the spirit of the legal and cultural tradition.”119  He 
too thinks that the judge “wishes to find a decision … which is ‘valid’ 
[valid2].”
120
 And just like Hart, Ross thinks that if a judge considers a 
legal rule valid (valid2) it implies that the judge apply the rule “as an 
integral part of the reasoning underlying the judgement,”121 i.e., as a 
premise in an argument claiming to justify a particular legal 
decision!
122
 
In other words, there can be little doubt that Ross considers the 
relevant propositional attitude epistemic in more or less the same way 
Hart does, i.e. as a cognizance.  It might be objected that this 
contradicts Ross’s more general norm-skepticism, but this confounds 
epistemological and phenomenological levels of the discussion.  A 
gambler who holds that the preceding series of ten consecutive blacks 
on the roulette has increased her chances of winning the next bet on red 
obviously takes this belief to be correct.  If challenged she will 
presumably cite the preceding series as her reason for holding it, as its 
justification.  Qua attitude, then, this belief is indistinguishable from 
that of the gambler next to her who unlike her thinks that the 
probability of red winning next is left unaffected by the preceding 
series.  She too will take her particular belief to be correct, and if 
challenged she too will cite particular beliefs as her reason for holding 
it; as its justification.  To be sure, she will cite different (and 
presumably better) reasons, but this has no bearing on her attitude qua 
attitude.  Both gamblers, it seems, take their respective beliefs to be 
correct and “socially binding” in the same way; that is, they consider 
its correctness a matter not of their individual thoughts or feelings but 
of its intersubjective justifiability.  The difference, then, is a fact, not of 
 
 119. ROSS, supra note 9, at 138. 
 120. Id. at 99. 
 121. See Id. at 42. 
 122. See Id. at 62, 283–84. 
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the attitude but of its actual justifiability.  The difference is not 
phenomenological but epistemological. 
This example illustrates more generally the importance of 
separating questions regarding perceived justifiability from questions 
regarding actual justifiability.  It tells us that we do not, in order to 
determine whether a given propositional attitude is epistemic, i.e. 
whether the person who holds it takes the proposition to be justifiable, 
have to establish that that proposition is in fact also justifiable.  On the 
contrary, it is perfectly possible to express scepticism with regard to the 
actual justifiability of given beliefs while simultaneously fully 
recognising the presence of contrary beliefs in other people.  This was 
precisely what Ross did when he described how the judge tries to make 
“decisions which he feels to be ‘right’ . . .”123 
In fact, this last point is just to repeat and reapply the distinction 
between norm-expression and norm-description, and thus to show that 
Frege’s insight described above as to the truth-condition transforming 
capabilities of propositional attitude reports holds good also with 
regard to epistemic attitudes. 
 CONCLUSION—AND BEYOND: ON THE REAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
ROSS’S LEGAL REALISM AND HART’S LEGAL POSITIVISM 
By now it should be clear that Ross did not make any of the 
mistakes Hart accused him of.  First of all, Ross did not overlook the 
internal aspect of legal rules.  On the contrary, under the heading “a 
coherent whole of meaning and motivation,” Ross was completely 
aware of its existence and repeatedly stressed the need for an 
“introspective method” in order to capture it.  And in spite of Hart’s 
claim to the opposite Ross did not misconstrue this internal aspect 
either.  On the contrary, he gave a full and, if anything, even richer 
phenomenological analysis of it than did Hart.
124
  In other words, by 
portraying the rich phenomenology of Ross’s account of the judge’s 
normative ideology as just one big un-analysable blob of “feelings of 
compulsion,” Hart in effect committed a straw man fallacy. 
But this raises a final question as to the more general upshot of 
this entire discussion.  What are the broader implications of these 
conclusions for our understanding of the theoretical relationship 
between the legal philosophies espoused by Ross and Hart 
respectively?  And what are or what should be the implications more 
generally for our understanding of the theoretical relationship between 
legal realism and legal positivism? 
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One natural option, perhaps, would be to conclude that Ross and 
Hart were actually in agreement on fundamentals.  If Ross did not 
make any of the mistakes Hart accused him of, it could seem natural to 
conclude that they were really in agreement.  In effect, this was the 
conclusion drawn by Eng in his recent study of the exchanges between 
Ross and Hart.  Here Eng concluded that “Hart’s method . . . is also 
Ross’s method . . .,”125 that any perception of a “theoretical gulf” 
between the two “is deceptive.”126 
On this reading, then, the primary result of setting the record 
straight is a minor correction to that long chapter in the history of 20th 
century legal philosophy dealing with Hart’s enormous influence.  This 
chapter currently hails Hart for accomplishing a substantial 
methodological breakthrough to jurisprudence precisely through his 
introduction of the distinction between the internal and external aspects 
of social rules.  To the extent the general conclusion to the foregoing 
discussion is that Ross and Hart were actually in agreement, the only 
upshot of it, then, would seem to be that contrary to widespread belief 
we in fact have a dual starting point for this important invention.  The 
discussion would not, however, have any deeper theoretical impact.  
Legal philosophy would be able to proceed undisturbed down the path 
it had already been moving since it (or some significant subset of it) 
decided to follow “Hart’s method.”  Only it would of course now in all 
decency have to admit that it was in fact following “Ross’s and Hart’s 
method”—and that it could have begun its journey a few years earlier 
had it not misunderstood Ross. 
Correspondingly in the broader theoretical landscape, if we take 
Ross and Hart as paradigmatic proponents of legal realism and legal 
positivism respectively, we would seem to end up with a blurring of 
any sharp boundary between legal realism and legal positivism.  By 
revealing these actual theoretical alignments, we would of course have 
to redraw our general theoretical map quite considerably, but besides a 
regained access to the more detailed insights of Ross’s work the 
rehabilitation of him (and potentially of other Scandinavians) would 
not imply any genuinely new jurisprudential insights. 
I believe however that this conclusion would be wrong.  Indeed I 
submit that we should draw the opposite conclusion: setting the record 
straight regarding Ross’s actual position makes us realize how he and 
Hart in fact remain in profound disagreement—primarily because even 
though Hart did to a great extent misrepresent Ross’s theory and in fact 
overtook or repeated central parts of it, he never fully appreciated 
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Ross’s most valuable and important insights. 
To be sure, any such fundamental disagreement lies not in their 
respective phenomenological descriptions of the internal aspect per se.  
In terms of phenomenology I see no crucial differences between 
them—as witnessed by the whole argument so far.  But Hart’s 
importance is usually ascribed, not so much to his alleged discovery of 
the internal aspect, but to the methodological conclusions he has been 
taken to draw on that background.  And the crucial difference between 
Hart and Ross lies precisely in the methodological conclusions they 
each draw from this.  Or fail to draw.  One of the benefits of exposing 
the deficiencies of Hart’s criticism of Ross is that it allows us to see the 
shortcomings of Hart’s theory more clearly.  Through the prism of 
Hart’s mistaken criticism and against the backdrop of the clear and 
principled position actually held by Ross we see first of all how 
underdeveloped Hart’s theory really is in terms of method.  Secondly, 
insofar that a coherent position on method can be reconstructed, we see 
also how unoriginal it comes out and how closely it resembles 
Kelsen’s version of legal positivism.  In other words—and contra 
Eng—the preceding study of Hart’s mistaken criticism of Ross allows 
us to reassert more clearly the categorical difference between legal 
realism and legal positivism. 
To see this we should first recapitulate the two key 
methodological insights of Ross’s theory, and then compare where Hart 
stands on each of these issues.  As we have seen Ross consistently 
observed two logically distinct theoretical distinctions.  First of all he 
urged us to abandon behaviourism and to apply an introspective 
method.  The scientific study of legal rules is possible, Ross claimed, 
only “through ideological interpretation, that is, by means of the 
hypothesis of a certain ideology which animates the judge and 
motivates his actions.”127 In this literal sense legal science has to be 
internal (~internal1). 
But by insisting that the propositions of legal science be norm-
descriptive, not norm-expressive, Ross also issued a methodological 
imperative with regard to a completely different internal-external 
divide, i.e. the one between directly expressing normative propositions 
(~internal2) and making propositional attitude reports about such 
propositions (~external2).  Introspection does not imply or necessitate 
adoption of the introspected point of view.  The legal scientist’s 
propositions about the existence of legal rules have to be propositional 
attitude reports (although the propositions of judges and lawyers 
obviously need not).  In this metaphorical sense, Ross’s method is 
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external because the legal scientist has to stay on the ‘outside’ of the 
propositional attitude context.  Qua scientist she is prohibited—for 
epistemological reasons—from adopting those same attitudes and from 
making (in whatever guarded/hypothetical way) those same statements.  
Instead, her job consists entirely of observing and stating the fact that 
somebody else (i.e. California, Illinois, common law etc. judges) have 
adopted the relevant kind of propositional attitude toward certain rules. 
So to sum up, Ross’s dual methodological advice in On Law and 
Justice is that legal science should be simultaneously internal1 and 
external2.  By contrast, and this is my critical claim, the sum of 
methodological wisdom found in Hart’s work amounts only to one 
explicit advice: don’t be behaviourist!  In other words: be internal1!  
Beyond correctly replicating (and oft repeating) this valuable insight, it 
is simply very hard to find an indication in The Concept of Law of 
Hart’s awareness of the existence—let alone the methodological 
importance—of an additional internal-external distinction along the 
lines observed by Ross.  And, insofar that it is possible to reconstruct a 
view indirectly from the scarce textual evidence, I submit that Hart’s 
methodological stance is that legal science should stay on the internal 
side also of this particular second kind of the internal-external divide, 
i.e. stay internal2! 
This may sound somewhat surprising considering the legacy of 
Hart’s legal philosophy.  After all, his version of legal positivism has 
been hailed by several theorists precisely for showing a “third way” 
between austere behaviourism and natural law.  MacCormick expresses 
this sentiment well: 
The ‘external point of view’ is not necessarily that of an outsider to 
the group. In its ‘extreme’ form it comprehends the point of view of 
all those who, whether from ignorance of agents’ subjective 
meanings or from scientific commitment, are restricted or restrict 
themselves to observation of human behavioural regularity.  This 
viewpoint is distinct from Hart’s ‘non-extreme external point of 
view.’  I called that the ‘hermeneutic point of view,’ because it is 
the viewpoint of one who, without (or in scientific abstraction 
from) any volitional commitment of his own, seeks to understand, 
portray, or describe human activity as it is meaningful ‘from the 
internal point of view.’  Such a one shares in the cognitive element 
of that latter point of view and gives full cognitive recognition to 
and appreciation of the latter’s volitional element.  Thus she can 
understand rules and standards for what they are, but does not 
endorse them for her part in stating or describing them or 
discussing their correct application.  This ‘hermeneutic point of 
view’ is in fact the viewpoint implicitly ascribed to and used by the 
legal theorist, scholar, or writer who follows Hart’s method 
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[. . .].
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It is first and foremost this hermeneutic or non-extreme external 
point of view which has earned Hart his reputation for methodological 
sophistication.  Several legal philosophers emphasise not merely Hart’s 
renunciation of behaviourism but rather his outlining of such a third 
point of view, which is external and yet distinct from the “extreme 
external point of view.”129  And when Eng claimed that “Hart’s method 
[. . .] is also Ross’s method”130 he referred precisely to this passage 
from MacCormick. 
Carving out such a moderate or non-extreme external point of 
view is attractive because it holds the promise of saving modern legal 
positivism from the scientistic excesses of its earlier versions without 
simultaneously losing the school’s distinctiveness from natural law.  
And judging from MacCormick’s description cited above one might 
find that Hart’s non-extreme external point of view has sufficient 
similarities with Ross’s dual internal1 & external2 approach to make at 
least prima facie plausible Eng’s claim that Hart’s method is also 
Ross’s method. 
To be sure, most theorists admit that Hart was in fact rather vague 
on this issue.  But they nevertheless assert that the third point of view 
must somehow be present as a tacit premise and they infer this more 
generally from Hart’s adherence to legal positivism and to meta-ethical 
non-cognitivism.
131
  In a characteristic passage, MacCormick thus 
writes: 
If there is any point which seems to capture that which the Hartian 
legal theorist as such must hold, it is surely this ‘nonextreme 
external point of view’ [. . .]  He does, after all, describe himself as 
a legal positivist, taking as his ground for that the proposition that 
understanding a law or a legal system in its character as such is a 
matter quite independent of one’s own moral or other commitment 
to upholding that law or legal system.
132
 
Correspondingly Eng maintains that Hart’s mistaken reading of 
Ross is explained by Hart’s “being lost in the Hartian system,”133 i.e. 
that the whole structure including the “third point of view” must have 
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been tacitly present in The Concept of Law all along. 
However, three points render this reading problematic.  First, it is 
simply very hard to find solid textual evidence for a third non-extreme 
external point of view in The Concept of Law.  In fact, Hart  admitted 
later in his career that he had not originally thought of any further 
distinctions besides internal1/external1 points of view, and he even 
expressed regret that he had overlooked the important, related 
distinction the between committed and detached normative statements 
later developed by Joseph Raz.
134
  Furthermore, Hart applauded this 
theoretical invention as a welcome opportunity to clarify his own 
theory praising the detached normative statements for creating the 
logical space to make sense of the difference between legal positivism 
and natural law.
135
 
Second, in terms of methodological innovation this seems to 
merely bring Hart right back into mainstream legal positivism!  Raz 
originally developed this distinction to make sense of Kelsen’s 
somewhat enigmatic claims about “ought-statements” in legal 
science.
136
  Hart was in fact very well aware of this link to Kelsen, and 
he emphasised how the concept of detached normative statements was 
for him the key to finally making sense of Kelsen’s theory about 
“ought-statements” and to see the deep commonalities with his own 
theory.
137
  In other words, if we equate Hart’s method with the making, 
from a non-extreme external point of view, of such detached normative 
statements it turns out that Hart’s method is for all practical purposes 
also Kelsen’s method. 
Third, whereas Hart is probably right in thinking that the 
distinction between detached and committed normative statements can 
consistently be added to his analysis of valid law, it should be strongly 
emphasised that detached statements nevertheless remain categorically 
different from the so-called norm-descriptive statements which Ross 
insists should be the cornerstone of legal science—and hence, that a 
deep theoretical gulf between Hart’s/Kelsen’s legal positivist method 
and Ross’s legal realist method remain. 
This is so because detached normative statements about valid 
law—as defined by Raz and later adopted by Hart—simply are not 
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statements about any social-psychological fact!  In Raz’s words: 
It is important not to confuse such statements from a point of view 
with statements about other people’s beliefs.  One reason is that 
there may be no one who has such a belief.  The friend in our 
example may be expressing a very uncommon view on an obscure 
point of Rabbinical law.  Indeed Rabbinical law may never have 
been endorsed or practiced by anybody, not even the enquiring 
Jew.
138
 
On the contrary, such detached normative statements are 
immediately norm-expressive in Ross’s sense: 
Nor can such statements be interpreted as conditionals: ‘If you 
accept this point of view then you should etc.’ Rather they assert 
what is the case from the relevant point of view as if it is valid or 
on the hypothesis that it is—as Kelsen expresses the point—but 
without actually endorsing it.
139
 
This immediately norm-expressive and hence clearly non-
propositional attitude reporting character of the detached normative 
statements coincides very well with the analysis of validity generally 
offered in The Concept of Law.  First of all, Hart’s truth conditions for 
statements about valid law are plainly very different from propositional 
attitude reports: “it is plain that there is no necessary connection 
between the validity of any particular rule and its efficacy . . .”140  
Instead they rely on a verification procedure where valid law is 
conceived as any normative conclusion arrived at through a valid chain 
of inter-normative reasoning from a given foundational norm: 
To say that a given rule is valid is to recognize it as passing all the 
tests provided by the rule of recognition and so as a rule of the 
system.  We can indeed simply say that the statement that a 
particular rule is valid means that it satisfies all the criteria 
provided by the rule of recognition.
141
 
At the same time this of course reminds us that there is one very 
well-known exception to this claim that Hart’s theory does not contain 
propositional attitude reports in the Rossian sense.  And this exception 
has to do with the validity of the foundational legal rule of a given legal 
system; the rule of recognition.  To Hart the validity of this particular 
rule can only be established in the following kind of propositional 
attitude report: “In England they recognize as law. . . whatever the 
Queen in parliament enacts.”142 
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It would however be a grave mistake to think that this particular 
similarity could somehow bridge the theoretical divide between Ross 
and Hart.  First of all, even Kelsen in his own way agrees that the 
validity of the basic norm of a legal system cannot be determined 
completely in ought-terms.
143
  He too insists that it presupposes at the 
very least the effectiveness of that norm.
144
  And not many legal 
philosophers would for that reason claim that Kelsen and Ross were 
ultimately in agreement.
145
  Second, Hart’s particular example (“In 
England they. . .”) is not a detached normative statement simply 
because it is not a statement from a point of view in the sense defined 
by Raz.
146
  Finally, we would do well to remember that Hart’s rule of 
recognition is exceptional in his comprehensive theory of valid law 
(like Kelsen’s basic norm is in his theory).  The rule of recognition is 
thus the only rule whose validity can be established thus.  For all other 
legal rules (all the primary rules) they can simply not, as we have seen, 
be construed as Rossian style statements about anybody’s beliefs; their 
validity is determined in a completely different, non-empirical manner, 
i.e. through a complex inter-normative chain of reasoning.  As Hart 
states: “It is of course common for a jurist expounding the law of some 
system to do so in the form of detached normative statements.”147  
Thus, more or less all propositions produced at ordinary law 
faculties—in tort law, EU-law, contract law, etc.—should, according to 
Hart, have the character of such detached normative statements.  The 
legal scientist’s statements should in all these areas be (detached) 
norm-expressive; not norm-descriptive. 
Based on these considerations, I think it is fair to conclude that 
Eng is wrong when he claims that Hart’s method is also Ross’s 
method.  On the contrary, the fundamental difference between their 
respective methods is clear: For Hart (as for Kelsen), once the rule of 
recognition (/the basic norm) has been identified empirically, legal 
science proceeds by making (detached) norm-expressive statements 
about valid primary rules.  It is thus a discipline in norms, i.e. a 
discipline that expresses normative conclusions on the basis of 
complex inter-normative inferences. 
This in contrast with Ross according to whom legal science shall 
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only make norm-descriptive assertions, i.e. propositional attitude 
reports about the totality of judges’ actual normative beliefs.  On this 
account legal science becomes a purely empirical study, i.e. a socio-
psychological study of the beliefs commonly held by judges, and of 
their likely judicial actions on the basis thereof. 
More generally, emerging from the study of the exchanges 
between Hart and Ross we see in these differences a simple, clear, and 
principled way of finally making sense of the notoriously elusive 
theoretical distinction between legal positivism and legal realism. 
 
 
